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We study rationing as a tool of the monopolist￿ s selling policy when demand is uncertain. Three selling
policies are potentially optimal in our environment: uniform pricing, ￿nal sales, and introductory o⁄ers.
Final sales consist in charging a high price initially, but then lowering the price while committing to
a total capacity. Consumers with a high valuation may decide to buy at the high price since the
endogenous probability of rationing is higher at the lower price. Introductory o⁄ers consist in selling a
limited quantity at a low price initially, and then raising price. Those consumers with high valuations
who were rationed initially at the lower price may ￿nd it optimal to buy the good at the higher price.
We show that the optimal selling policy involves either uniform pricing or ￿nal sales. Introductory
o⁄ers may dominate uniform pricing, but can never be optimal if the monopolist can also use ￿nal sales.
Keywords: rationing, priority pricing, sales, demand uncertainty, introductory o⁄er, price dispersion,
advance purchase discount
JEL-Classi￿cation: L12, M311 Introduction
Firms frequently charge di⁄erent prices for the same good at di⁄erent points in time (and sometimes
even contemporaneously). Such (intertemporal) price dispersion is often generated by priority pricing
or ￿nal sales: a ￿rm initially charges a high price and subsequently lowers the price for any remaining
items. Some consumers (namely those with a high willingness to pay or those who believe that demand
will be high) may prefer to purchase the good at the high price (so as to obtain the good with certainty)
rather than buying the good at a lower price and risking that the good may be sold out. Other consumers
(namely those with a low willingness to pay or those who believe that demand will be low) may resolve
the trade o⁄ by opting for a lower price and a higher probability of being rationed. Under demand
certainty, a ￿nal sales strategy may thus allow a ￿rm to screen between di⁄erent consumers with high
and low valuations. In the presence of demand uncertainty, setting di⁄erent prices may in addition allow
a ￿rm to discriminate between demand states.
The selling policies of many opera houses, theaters, and concert venues involve priority pricing:
advance ticket sales are complemented by lower priced ￿community rush tickets￿ , ￿day seats￿ , or standby
tickets. Similarly, holiday tour operators and airlines typically o⁄er both regular and last-minute deals.
(In the case of last-minute holiday packages, the consumer may not obtain the destination or hotel of
choice, while in the case of stand-by airline tickets, the consumer buys the ticket in advance but risks
to be forced to take a later ￿ ight, which he views as an inferior substitute.) Winter or summer sales for
fashion goods may also partially be explained by the idea of priority pricing. A less obvious example
of priority pricing concerns season tickets for sporting events (such as baseball or soccer) or cultural
events (such as concerts or operas); see Ferguson (1994). Some consumers may decide to buy a season
ticket knowing that they will miss many events so that the season ticket is likely to turn out to be more
expensive than buying single tickets only for those events the consumer actually attends. However, if
consumers choose to buy tickets only shortly prior to the event, they risk not obtaining the desired
ticket.1
In this paper, we consider the selling policy of a monopolist who faces uncertain demand. Before the
state of demand is realized, the monopolist has to commit to prices and capacities for each period. Then,
consumers (who want to buy only one unit of the good) learn their own willingness to pay, update their
beliefs about the underlying state of the world, and decide when to buy the good. Consumers rationally
anticipate the behavior of other consumers and thus the endogenous probabilities of rationing in each
period. Three selling policies are potentially optimal for the monopolist: uniform pricing, ￿nal sales,
and introductory o⁄ers. Uniform pricing means that the monopolist commits to charging the same
price in each period. As explained above, ￿nal sales consist in charging a high price initially, but then
lowering the price while committing to a total capacity. High valuation consumers may decide to buy
at the high price since the endogenous probability of rationing is higher at the lower price. Introductory
o⁄ers (or ￿advance-purchase discounts￿ ) consist in selling a limited quantity at a low price initially, and
then raising price. Those consumers with high valuations who were rationed at the lower price may ￿nd
it optimal to buy the good later at the higher price.
We consider a simple environment with two types of consumers (with high and low valuations,
respectively) and two demand states (a good and a bad state). We show that introductory o⁄ers are
never optimal in our model: the monopolist￿ s optimal selling policy either involves uniform pricing or
￿nal sales.
1This means that product bundling can implement priority pricing for those spectators who are only interested in
certain events for which rationing may occur. While living in England, the ￿rst author of this article often bought a
season ticket for the famous BBC Promenade Concert Series at the Royal Albert Hall, London, knowing that he would
only attend a small fraction of the more than seventy concerts. His rationale was to make sure that he could attend some
of the more popular concerts.
1An example. Suppose there are two states of the world, a good demand state and a bad demand
state, which are equally likely. Consumers have unit demand and may either have a high or a low
valuation for the good. High types have a willingness to pay of 7, and low types a valuation of 1,
independently of the demand state. In the good demand state, there is a mass 1 of high types, and a
mass 5 of low types. In the bad demand state, there are no high types, and a mass 4 of low types. A
consumer who learns that he has a high valuation can thus infer that the demand state must be good.
(In this example, it is therefore immaterial whether consumers directly learn the demand state or only
learn their own valuation before making their purchasing decision.) The monopolist produces at zero
cost and may set prices and capacities for two periods. In the case of excess demand in one period,
consumers are rationed randomly. There is no discounting.
First, consider uniform pricing and introductory o⁄ers. Conditional on charging a single price,
the monopolist will optimally set a price of 1. This yields expected pro￿ts of 0:5 ￿ 4 + 0:5 ￿ 6 =
5. Alternatively, the monopolist can make a limited introductory o⁄er and charge a higher price to
consumers who are rationed in period 1. The monopolist￿ s optimal introductory o⁄er strategy is to o⁄er
4 units at a price of 1 in the ￿rst period, and to serve any unserved consumers at a price of 7 in the
second period. Consumers arrive at random, and so are rationed with probability 1=3 in period 1 if the
state of demand is good. Hence, consumers of mass 1=3 buy the good at the high price in the good
demand state. In expected terms, the monopolist makes a pro￿t of 0:5￿4+0:5￿(4+(1=3)￿7) = 5:167.
This strategy dominates uniform pricing.
Second, consider ￿nal sales. The optimal strategy with ￿nal sales consists in setting total capacity
equal to 4, charging a ￿rst-period price p1 with 7 > p1 > 1, and o⁄ering all remaining units in the
second period at a price of p2 = 1. In the bad demand state, there are no high valuation consumers,
and all low valuation consumers purchase the good in the second period. In the high demand state,
all high type consumers buy the good in the ￿rst period, while the low types demand the good in the
second period (and hence are rationed with probability 0:4). Indeed, high type consumers weakly prefer
to demand the good in the ￿rst period rather than in the second period if 7￿p1 ￿ 0:6￿(7￿1), where
0:6 is the probability of not being rationed in the second period. Hence, the monopolist will optimally
set p1 = 3:4, which results in an expected pro￿t of 0:5 ￿ 4 ￿ 1 + 0:5 ￿ (1 ￿ 3:4 + 3 ￿ 1) = 5:2.
Comparing pro￿ts, we observe that ￿nal sales perform better than introductory o⁄ers and uniform
pricing.
Intuitively, the attraction of a uniform price is that it allows the monopolist to extract all of the
surplus from a given consumer type and to ￿ exibly serve all demand at this price. On the other hand,
however, if the monopolist charges a high uniform price, she e⁄ectively excludes low type consumers,
while if she charges a low uniform price, she cannot discriminate between consumers with high and low
valuation. Moreover, under demand uncertainty, the monopolist cannot discriminate between demand
states by charging di⁄erent prices (but only by selling di⁄erent quantities at the same price).
Both introductory o⁄er and ￿nal sales strategies allow the monopolist to e⁄ectively charge di⁄erent
prices and thus to discriminate between consumers. Under both selling strategies, high type consumers
always obtain the good, while low type consumers obtain the good in each demand state with a di⁄erent
probability. This implies that the monopolist can (partially) discriminate between demand states as
the number of consumers of each type varies with the demand state. By charging a second-period price
equal to the valuation of the high type consumers, the introductory o⁄er strategy allows the monopolist
to fully extract the surplus of those consumers who are forced to purchase the good in the second period.
However, a fraction of the high type consumers will be able to buy the good at the low ￿rst-period price.
In contrast, under the ￿nal sales strategy, all high type consumers pay a higher price than the low type
consumers, but the monopolist has to leave them some rent (as they have the option to purchase the
good at the lower second-period price and be rationed with positive probability).
The pro￿t comparison between the di⁄erent selling policies seems to be rather complex as they di⁄er
2not only in the expected prices the two consumer types have to pay, but also in the quantities sold.
Using insights from mechanism design theory, however, it can be reduced to a comparison of the implied
probabilities of rationing high and low type consumers in the two demand states. In the above example,
if the monopolist could condition her prices on the demand state (but not on the consumer type), she
would optimally charge a (uniform) price equal to the valuation of the high type when demand is in
the good state, and a (uniform) price equal to the valuation of the low type when demand is in the bad
state. That is, the monopolist would not like to ration the high type consumers in any demand state,
nor the low type consumers in the bad demand state, but the low type consumers with probability
1 in the good state. In the example, when demand is in the bad state, the optimal uniform price,
optimal ￿nal sales, and optimal introductory o⁄er strategies all induce the same rationing probabilities
as the optimal state-contingent pricing policy. Hence, the pro￿t di⁄erences between these selling policies
are due to di⁄erent induced probabilities of rationing in the good demand state. When demand is in
the good state, low type consumers are rationed with probability 0 under the optimal uniform pricing
policy, with probability 1=3 under introductory o⁄ers, and 2=5 under ￿nal sales. The optimal ￿nal sales
strategy thus comes closest to the optimal state-contingent pricing policy. As we will show in this paper,
this insight holds more generally.
Related Literature. Our paper complements the existing literature on pricing strategies with commit-
ment and provides a stronger theoretical underpinning for the use of ￿nal sales strategies. Earlier work
has considered the use of introductory o⁄er and ￿nal sales strategies under demand certainty. Wilson
(1988) analyzes the problem of a monopolist who wants to sell a given quantity q of a good. He shows
that an introductory o⁄er strategy may be more pro￿table than a uniform pricing strategy (namely if
and only if there exists a neighborhood around q where the single-price revenue function is non-concave
in quantity). However, if the monopolist can choose the quantity q she wants to sell, and the marginal
cost of production is non-increasing, then uniform pricing is always optimal.2 Ferguson (1994) shows
that whenever uniform pricing is not optimal, the best ￿nal sales strategy is revenue equivalent to the
best introductory o⁄er strategy, for any given quantity q. Hence, the existing results under demand
certainty do not allow us to predict when a monopolist should prefer a ￿nal sales strategy over an
introductory o⁄er strategy, or vice versa. Moreover, they indicate that non-uniform pricing should be
observed only if the single-price revenue function is non-concave in quantity and there are decreasing
returns to scale in production.
In a model similar to ours, Dana (2001) considers a monopolist who faces uncertain demand and
can serve any demand at constant marginal cost of production. He shows that introductory o⁄ers may
dominate uniform pricing. However, Dana does not allow for ￿nal sales strategies.
Harris and Raviv (1981) also analyze monopoly pricing under demand uncertainty. They show that
priority pricing is an optimal strategy for a monopolist who produces at constant marginal costs but
faces a (binding) capacity constraint. However, in their model, demand uncertainty is of a very special
kind: there are a ￿nite number of (large) buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Hence, as the number of buyers
increases, demand uncertainty vanishes in the limit. Furthermore, Harris and Raviv show that if the
monopolist can costlessly choose capacity (and thus serve any demand at constant marginal cost), then
uniform pricing dominates other pricing schemes (see also Riley and Zeckhauser, 1983).
To summarize, the above-mentioned papers ￿with the exception of Dana (2001) ￿rely on sunk
costs (or decreasing returns) to generate price dispersion. The same is true for the literature on price
dispersion in competitive markets (Prescott, 1975; Eden, 1990; Dana, 1998).3 Following Dana (2001),
2As Denicolo and Garella (1999) have shown, introductory o⁄ers are also a useful strategy if the monopolist lacks
commitment power beyond the ￿rst period. Clearly, ￿nal sales strategies can only be used if commitment for two periods
is possible.
3Dana (1999b) extends the Prescott model of price dispersion to monopoly and imperfect competition. Gale and
Holmes (1993) consider a capacity-constrained monopolist selling two substitute products, a ￿peak￿ and an ￿o⁄-peak￿
3we do not assume that costs are sunk before sales occur. We show that the revenue equivalence between
introductory o⁄ers and ￿nal sales does not hold when demand is uncertain. Introductory o⁄ers are
never optimal in our model: whenever they perform better than uniform pricing, they are dominated
by ￿nal sales.
Our plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present our model. In section 3, we analyze the
monopolist￿ s optimal selling strategy. First, we consider the case of demand certainty. Then, we turn to
the main concern of this paper, the optimal selling policy under demand uncertainty. Finally, in section
4, we discuss our key assumptions and model extensions.
2 The Model
We consider a monopolist who sells a homogeneous product over T = 2 periods.4 As in the example of
concert tickets and the like, consumption takes place (simultaneously) after period 2. Hence, the time
of purchase does not directly a⁄ect consumers￿utility, and so there is no discounting. More generally,
consumers view one unit of the good in period 1 as a perfect substitute for one unit of the good in
period 2. That is, we may also think of consumers consuming the good immediately after purchase,
provided their discount rate is zero.
Consumers. There is a mass M of potential consumers with unit demand. Demand is random and
can be in either one of two states ￿ 2 fG;Bg: a good demand state, G, and a bad demand state, B.
In each demand state, each consumer gets a random draw of his willingness to pay. Consumers can
have a high valuation or a low valuation for the good. Moreover, some consumers may not value the
good at all; we call such consumers ￿null types￿ . High types are denoted by H, low types by L, null
types by ?, and the generic consumer type by ￿ 2 fH;L;?g. In demand state ￿, the probability that
a consumer￿ s type is ￿ is given by m(￿j￿)=M. Here, m(￿j￿) denotes the mass of consumers of type ￿ in
state ￿. We assume that there are (weakly) more high types in the good demand state than in the bad
demand state; that is,
m(HjG) ￿ m(HjB):
Moreover, the total mass of consumers with positive valuation is at least as large in the good demand
state as in the bad state:
m(HjG) + m(LjG) ￿ m(HjB) + m(LjB):
Also, we require that m(Lj￿) > 0 for ￿ 2 fG;Bg.
Conditional on buying one unit of the product at price p, a consumer of type ￿ has (indirect) utility
v(￿) ￿ p;
where v(￿) is the consumer￿ s willingness to pay.5 High types have a higher willingness to pay than
low types, v(H) > v(L). The valuation of a null type is equal to zero, v(?) = 0.6 We normalize the
willingness to pay of the high type (in both demand states) to 1, and so the willingness to pay of the
low type satis￿es v(L) 2 (0;1).
Before making his purchasing decision, each consumer observes a signal s about the underlying
aggregate demand state. In this paper, we focus on the information structure, where each consumer
￿ight. They show that introductory o⁄ers (or advance-purchase discounts) are optimal. See also Dana (1999a) and Gale
and Holmes (1992).
4We will also brie￿y discuss the more general case, where the good can be sold over T ￿ 2 periods.
5In Nocke and Peitz (2003), we also analyze a variant of the model, where valuations depend on the demand state; see
our discussion.
6Clearly, null types will never purchase the good. We introduce the construct of a null type for technical reasons so as
to be able to use Bayesian updating; see footnote 9.
4only observes his own valuation , i.e., s = v(￿), and updates his beliefs about the demand state ￿ using
Bayes￿rule. We only brie￿ y discuss the alternative information structure, where each consumer directly
observes the true state of demand, i.e., s = ￿ 2 fG;Bg. This alternative information structure is fully
analyzed in our discussion paper, Nocke and Peitz (2003).
The Monopolist￿ s Strategies. The monopolist can produce any amount of the homogeneous good at
constant marginal cost c. Without loss of generality, we set c = 0. The monopolist can sell the product
over two periods, t = 1;2. Before the demand state is realized, she sets prices p1 and p2 for periods 1
and 2, respectively. In addition, she can commit to a capacity for period 1, k1, and to a total cumulative
capacity (for both periods), k ￿ k1. Ex ante, the monopolist thus sets an overall capacity k, and may
commit not to sell more than a certain fraction of this capacity (namely, k1 units) in t = 1. Any capacity
unsold in the ￿rst period is then available in t = 2. (One extreme interpretation, consistent with our
assumptions, is that the monopolist has to produce all k units before the state of the world is realized.
In fact, this interpretation re￿ ects quite well the motivating examples in the introduction.) By setting a
price pt and a capacity, the monopolist commits to serving all demand up to capacity at price pt. There
are no capacity costs. (This assumption is for expositional simplicity. As we discuss in the conclusion,
our main results hold for any positive and constant costs per unit of capacity.) Following Dana (2001),
we assume that prices and capacities are set before demand uncertainty is resolved. Therefore, the
monopolist cannot condition them on the state of demand ￿.7 Moreover, the identity of consumers is
unknown to the monopolist ahead of time, and so forward contracts with consumers cannot be written.
Depending on the intertemporal pro￿le of prices, we can distinguish between three di⁄erent types of
selling policies:
Uniform pricing. The monopolist sets prices such that, with probability 1, all items are sold at the
same price. In particular, setting the same price in both periods, p1 = p2, is a uniform pricing
strategy.
Introductory O⁄ers. The monopolist sets a lower price in the ￿rst period, p1 < p2, and some units
are sold in each period with positive probability (that is, in at least one demand state).
Final Sales. The monopolist sets a lower price in the second period, p1 > p2, and some units are sold
in each period with positive probability (that is, in at least one demand state).
Since consumers clearly prefer to purchase the good at the lowest possible price, an introductory
o⁄er strategy must have the property that ￿rst-period capacity k1 is binding in at least one demand
state (otherwise all units would be sold at the low price in the ￿rst period). Similarly, a ￿nal sales
strategy must have the property that total capacity k is binding with positive probability (otherwise,
all consumers would always prefer to buy the good at the low price in the second period).
Consumer Rationing. Since the monopolist can commit to capacities, consumers may be rationed
in period 1, period 2, or both periods. Again following Dana (2001), we assume that rationing is
proportional (or random). Under the proportional rationing rule (see, for example, Beckmann (1965),
and Davidson and Deneckere (1986)), each consumer who is willing to purchase the good has the same
probability of obtaining the good. That is, if a mass m of consumers demand the good, but only a
quantity k < m is available, then each consumer ￿independently of his type ￿is served with probability
k=m. Note that this rationing rule is consistent with a queuing model, where consumers arrive in random
order, and consumers who arrive ￿rst are served ￿rst.
Consumer Equilibrium. Observing the monopolist￿ s strategy (p1;p2;k1;k) and their (private) signals
about the demand state ￿, consumers make their purchasing decisions. For any (p1;p2;k1;k) and
distribution of signals, consumers thus play an anonymous game with discrete actions. A consumer
7There are a number of other papers on price discrimination where ￿rms have to commit to prices before the demand
uncertainty is resolved; see Stole (2001) for a survey.
5equilibrium is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of this (sub-)game. For p1 ￿ p2, consumers have a (weakly)
dominant strategy: ￿demand the good in the ￿rst period if and only if your willingness to pay is equal
to or higher than p1; if you are rationed in the ￿rst period, demand the good in the second period,
provided your valuation is at least p2.￿Moreover, any consumer equilibrium is revenue equivalent for
the monopolist. In contrast, if the monopolist chooses a ￿nal sales strategy (and so p1 > p2), a consumer
may not have a dominant strategy. The only reason why consumers may be willing to buy the good at
the higher price in the ￿rst period is that they expect to be rationed with a higher probability at the
lower price in the second period. However, if consumers expect that more consumers postpone their
purchase until t = 2, they expect a lower probability of rationing in the second period (as the monopolist
will sell all unsold units in the second period), and hence buying in the second period becomes more
attractive. This may give rise to the existence of multiple consumer equilibria with di⁄erent revenues.
The best consumer equilibrium from the monopolist￿ s point of view (and the worst from the consumers￿
point of view) is the one that maximizes sales at the high price (in t = 1).
The Monopolist￿ s Maximization Problem. The monopolist optimally chooses her strategy (p1;p2;k1;k)
assuming that, in each subgame, consumers￿purchasing decisions form a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium.
To obtain a unique solution, we select, for each (￿nal sales) strategy of the monopolist, the best consumer
equilibrium (from the monopolist￿ s point of view).8
3 The Optimal Selling Policy
3.1 Pricing under Demand Certainty
To understand the role of demand uncertainty for non-uniform pricing, we ￿rst consider the case of
demand certainty. Suppose there are no demand shocks, i.e., m(￿j￿) is independent of the state of
demand ￿. To simplify notation, we can then write the mass of consumer type ￿ as m(￿), and set the
total mass of consumers with positive valuation to 1, so that m(L) = 1 ￿ m(H). We proceed in two
steps. First, we analyze the problem where the monopolist faces an exogenous quantity ceiling q, where
w.l.o.g. q ￿ 1. Then, we allow the monopolist to choose the quantity without any restrictions, which
amounts to setting the quantity ceiling q = 1.
A mechanism design perspective. It will prove helpful to ￿rst analyze the following mechanism design
problem since the monopolist￿ s selling policies are equivalent to some mechanisms. We restrict attention
to mechanisms which consist, for each consumer type ￿, of a probability R(￿) at which the consumer
obtains the good and a price P(￿) that the consumer has to pay if and only if he receives the good. By
the revelation principle we can restrict attention to direct-revelation mechanisms. Clearly, any selling
policy (p1;k1;p2;k) considered in this paper, including uniform pricing, introductory o⁄ers, and ￿nal
sales, induces probabilities R(￿) and prices P(￿), and can thus be represented by an element of this
class of mechanisms. We will show that, under demand certainty, the solution to the mechanism design
problem can be implemented by at least one of the three selling policies. That is, any optimal selling
policy implements the solution to the mechanism design problem.
Formally, the monopolist￿ s design problem can be written as
max
R(H);R(L);P(H);P(L)
m(H)R(H)P(H) + [1 ￿ m(H)]R(L)P(L)
subject to
￿ the quantity constraint m(H)R(H) + [1 ￿ m(H)]R(L) ￿ q, and
8In section 4, we discuss a perturbation of the model, which introduces heterogeneity in consumers￿valuations, and
can lead to a unique consumer equilibrium.
6￿ the incentive (IC￿) and individual rationality (IR￿) constraints for each type ￿.
Since the standard single-crossing property is satis￿ed, it is well known that the solution to such a
problem satis￿es the (ICH) and (IRL) constraints with equality, while the (ICL) and (IRH) constraints
are nonbinding. Using the binding (ICH) and (IRL) constraints, we can rewrite the monopolist￿ s design
problem purely in terms of the two probabilities R(H) and R(L):
max
R(H);R(L)
m(H)R(H) + [v(L) ￿ m(H)]R(L)
s.t. m(H)R(H) + [1 ￿ m(H)]R(L) ￿ q:
The solution to this problem is
R(H) =
￿






1￿m(H) if q > m(H) and v(L) > m(H)
0 otherwise.
The optimal selling policy. If q ￿ m(H) or m(H) ￿ v(L), the solution to the mechanism design
problem can be implemented by the uniform price p = 1: the low type consumers do not purchase the
good, while all high types attempt to purchase the good (and are rationed with positive probability
if q < m(H)). If q = 1 and m(H) ￿ v(L), the uniform price p = v(L) implements the optimum: all
consumers obtain the good with probability 1. Hence, if the monopolist can freely choose how much to
sell, i.e., q = 1, the optimal selling policy is a uniform price, namely p = 1 if m(H) ￿ v(L) and p = v(L)
if m(H) ￿ v(L).
We now claim that if m(H) < q < 1 and v(L) > m(H), then the solution to the mechanism design
problem can be implemented by both an introductory o⁄er and a ￿nal sales strategy, but not by a
uniform price. In fact, the optimal ￿nal sales and introductory o⁄er strategies are revenue equivalent
and implement the same allocation. As should be clear, this result is closely related to the well-known
revenue equivalence result in auction theory. In the case of ￿nal sales, the monopolist sets a total
capacity of k = q, charges p1 = (1 ￿ r￿(q))1 + r￿(q)v(L) in period 1, and p2 = v(L) in period 2, where
r￿(q) = R(L) = [q ￿ m(H)]=[1￿m(H)] is the probability of obtaining the good in period 2. This policy
makes the high type consumers just willing to purchase the good at the high ￿rst-period price, and so
R(H) = 1, as they face a probability 1 ￿ r￿(q) of being rationed at the low second-period price. In
the case of introductory o⁄ers, the monopolist charges a ￿rst-period price of p1 = v(L) and commits
to the ￿rst-period capacity k1 = r￿(q). In the second period, she charges the price p2 = 1, and sells
(1 ￿ r￿)m(H) units.
Another way of illustrating the di⁄erent selling policies is the following. Consider the single-price
revenue or pro￿t function
￿(x) =
￿
x if x ￿ m(H);
v(L)x if x 2 (m(H);1];
where x ￿ q is quantity sold. By charging a uniform price, the monopolist can obtain the maximum
(over x ￿ q) of this single-price pro￿t function: maxx￿q ￿(x) = maxf￿(m(H));￿(q)g. Observe now that
￿(x) has a downward-jump at x = m(H) and is thus not concave. Let ￿(x) denote the ￿concavi￿ed￿
single-price revenue or pro￿t function, de￿ned by
￿(x) =
(










v(L) if x 2 (m(H);1]:
7This concavi￿ed pro￿t lies everywhere weakly above the single-price pro￿t function, ￿(x) ￿ ￿(x) for all
x. Moreover, if m(H) < q < 1 and v(L) > m(H), we have ￿(q) > maxx￿q ￿(x) = maxf￿(m(H));￿(q)g.
Importantly, the monopolist can obtain the pro￿t ￿(q) = (1￿r￿(q))m(H)+r￿(q)v(L) by either using the
￿nal sales or the introductory o⁄er strategies described above. However, in this case, ￿(q) is increasing
in q, and so the monopolist optimally chooses the uniform price v(L) if she does not face the exogenous
quantity ceiling. We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under demand certainty, the optimal ￿nal sales and introductory o⁄er strategies for a
￿xed quantity ceiling q are revenue equivalent. However, if the monopolist does not face an exogenous
quantity ceiling, then the optimal selling policy is a uniform pricing strategy.
3.2 Pricing under Demand Uncertainty
Proposition 1 shows that uniform pricing is always optimal in our model when demand is certain. We
now turn to the main concern of this paper, the monopolist￿ s optimal selling policy when demand is
uncertain. We focus on the information structure where consumers do not directly observe the demand
state, but only their own valuation. Since the distribution of consumer types varies with the state of
demand, a consumer￿ s best reply to the purchasing strategies of other consumers may depend on his
beliefs about the state of demand. Learning his own type, a Bayesian consumer uses this information
to update his beliefs about the underlying demand state. However, a consumer￿ s private signal s is
typically not perfectly revealing (the example in the introduction is an exception in this respect).9 A
consumer who learns that he has a high valuation, will (using Bayes￿rule) compute the probability of
the state of demand being good as10
Q(GjH) =
￿m(HjG)
￿m(HjG) + (1 ￿ ￿)m(HjB)
:
The optimal state-contingent selling policy. From proposition 1 we know that if the monopolist could
condition her selling policy on the state of demand ￿ (which, of course, she cannot in our model), she
would optimally set a uniform price p(￿). The optimal state-contingent (uniform) prices are as follows.
In the good demand state, p(G) = 1 if
m(HjG) > [m(HjG) + m(LjG)]v(L); (1)
and p(G) = v(L) if the inequality is reversed. In the bad demand state, p(B) = v(L) if
m(HjB) < [m(HjB) + m(LjB)]v(L); (2)
9To be able to use Bayes￿rule in our setting, we must specify the size of the population of consumers, which must be
independent of the realization of the state of the world. Since the total mass of high and low type consumers may be
larger in the good demand state than in the bad demand state, m(HjG)+m(LjG) ￿ m(HjB)+m(LjB), we introduce the
construct of a ￿null type￿. Recall that a null type has a valuation of zero, and is thus not willing to buy at any (positive)
price. The mass of null types in demand state ￿ is the di⁄erence between the total mass of consumers and the mass of
high and low type consumers, m(?j￿) = M ￿[m(Hj￿) + m(Lj￿)] ￿ 0. That is, while the total mass of high, low, and null
types is independent of the demand state, the shares of the di⁄erent types are state-dependent.
10The probability of being a consumer of type ￿ 2 fL;H;?g, given that the demand state is ￿ 2 fG;Bg, can be written
as Q(￿j￿) = m(￿j￿)=M. Recall that the unconditional probability of a good and bad demand state is given by Q(G) = ￿
and Q(B) = 1 ￿ ￿, respectively. Hence, the unconditional probability of being a high type is equal to













8and p(B) = 1 if the inequality is reversed. In our analysis of the optimal selling policy, these optimal
state-contingent prices will provide a useful benchmark.
A mechanism design perspective. As in the case of demand certainty, it will prove helpful to consider
the related problem of a mechanism designer. We restrict attention to mechanisms which consist, for
each consumer type ￿ and demand state ￿, of a probability R(￿j￿) at which the consumer obtains the
good and a price P(￿j￿), which is paid by the consumer if and only if he obtains the good. (Formally,
the probabilities and prices do not directly depend on the state of demand but rather on the consumer￿ s
report of his own type and the reports of all other consumers. However, if almost all consumers report
their types truthfully, the monopolist knows the demand state for sure. Abusing notation, we therefore
write the probabilities and prices directly as a function of the consumer￿ s own reported type and the state
of demand.) In addition to the (interim) incentive constraints (IC￿) for the high and low types, we require
that the mechanism has to satisfy the ex post individual rationality constraints (XIR￿;￿): in each demand
state, the price a consumer has to pay cannot be larger than his willingness to pay, P(￿j￿) ￿ v(￿). (These
ex post individual rationality constraints appear reasonable whenever consumers cannot be forced (by
contracts) to purchase a good.) Clearly, any selling policy (p1;k1;p2;k) considered in this paper, induces
probabilities R(￿j￿) and prices P(￿j￿) and satis￿es the ex post individual rationality constraints, and
can thus be represented by an element of this class of mechanisms. Below, we will show that the solution
to this mechanism design problem is revenue-equivalent to the optimal state-contingent prices.
Formally, the monopolist￿ s design problem can be written as
maxR(￿j￿);P(￿j￿) ￿fm(HjG)R(HjG)P(HjG) + m(LjG)R(LjG)P(LjG)g
+(1 ￿ ￿)fm(HjB)R(HjB)P(HjB) + m(LjB)R(LjB)P(LjB)g
subject to
￿ the (interim) incentive constraints (IC￿) for each type ￿:
Q(Gj￿)
￿











where ￿ 2 fH;Lg, ￿ 6= ￿, and
￿ the ex post individual rationality constraints (XIR￿;￿) for each type ￿ and demand state ￿:
P(￿j￿) ￿ v(￿):
It is straightforward to show that the solution to this problem satis￿es the high valuation consumer￿ s
incentive constraint (ICH) with equality. Also, the low type￿ s (ex post) individual rationality constraints
(XIRL;￿) are binding for both demand states whenever R(Lj￿) > 0.11 As will become clear later, any
selling policy (￿nal sales, introductory o⁄ers, and uniform pricing) that is optimal within its own class
(i.e., within the class of ￿nal sales, introductory o⁄ers, or uniform pricing strategies) also satis￿es the
same constraints with equality.12 Replacing P(LjG) = P(LjB) = v(L) in (ICH), we obtain that
















11If R(Lj￿) = 0, the (XIRL;￿) constraint becomes irrelevant and P(Lj￿) cancels out in the monopolist￿ s expected
revenue.
12The constraint P(￿j￿) ￿ v(￿) holds with equality whenever R(￿j￿) > 0. Hence, if the monopolist charges a uniform
price p = 1, she does not sell to the low types, i.e., R(Lj￿) = 0, and so the constraint becomes irrelevant.





R(HjG) ￿ R(LjG)(1 ￿ v(L)) +
1 ￿ Q(GjH)
Q(GjH)
[R(HjB) ￿ R(LjB)(1 ￿ v(L))]
￿
+m(LjG)R(LjG)v(L)g + (1 ￿ ￿)m(LjB)R(LjB)v(L)
= ￿m(HjG)R(HjG) + ￿f[m(HjG) + m(LjG)]v(L) ￿ m(HjG)gR(LjG)
+(1 ￿ ￿)m(HjB)R(HjB) + (1 ￿ ￿)f[m(HjB) + m(LjB)]v(L) ￿ m(HjB)gR(LjB) (3)
Maximizing this expression, we obtain that the monopolist should serve high type consumers with
probability 1 and low type consumers with probability 0 whenever the optimal state-contingent price
is p(￿) = 1. Similarly, she should serve all consumers with probability 1 whenever the optimal state-
contingent price is p(￿) = v(L). That is,
R(Hj￿) = 1 for ￿ = G;B;
R(LjG) =
￿




1 if (2) holds
0 otherwise. (ProbOPT)
When comparing the revenues of our di⁄erent selling policies, we can thus focus on comparing the
implied probabilities of serving the di⁄erent consumers in the two demand states and analyze how
￿close￿these are to the probabilities in the optimal benchmark.
Comparison of di⁄erent selling policies. We now turn to the main concern of this paper, the analysis
of the optimal selling policy (p1;k1;p2;k) under demand uncertainty. We ￿rst follow Dana (2001) in
restricting attention to selling strategies with non-decreasing price paths, and compare introductory
o⁄ers with uniform pricing. Then, we also allow for decreasing price paths and compare ￿nal sales
strategies with introductory o⁄ers and uniform pricing.
Uniform pricing. Let us ￿rst consider uniform pricing, where the monopolist sets the same price p
in both periods. Under uniform pricing, the monopolist has no incentive to ration consumers, and will
thus set capacities k = k1 = m(HjG) + m(LjG) so that demand can always be met. Independently of
his beliefs about the demand state (and the behavior of other consumers), a consumer will optimally
purchase the good (in either period 1 or 2) if and only if the price is lower than his willingness to pay.
Clearly, the monopolist will optimally extract all of the surplus from one of the two consumer types.
Hence, we can con￿ne attention to two uniform prices, p = 1 and p = v(L). The induced probabilities




0 if p = 1;
1 if p = v(L): (ProbU)
for ￿ = G;B. These induced probabilities in conjunction with the prices P(￿j￿) = p constitute a
mechanism of the class de￿ned above. In particular, the (interim) incentive constraint of the high
consumer type is binding, as are the (ex post) individual rationality constraints of the low type whenever
he obtains the good with positive probability (i.e., p = v(L)). Note that the high uniform price, p = 1,
implements the optimal mechanism if (1) holds, but (2) does not. Similarly, the low uniform price,
p = v(L), implements the optimum if (2) holds, but (1) does not. Expected pro￿ts, which can be
obtained by inserting the probabilities (ProbU) into equation (3), are





￿m(HjG) + (1 ￿ ￿)m(HjB) if p = 1 > v(L);
v(L)[￿(m(HjG) + m(LjG))
+(1 ￿ ￿)(m(HjB) + m(LjB))] if p = v(L):
Hence, the pro￿t-maximizing uniform price is p = v(L) if
￿f[m(HjG) + m(LjG)]v(L) ￿ m(HjG)g
+(1 ￿ ￿)f[m(HjB) + m(LjB)]v(L) ￿ m(HjB)g > 0; (4)
and p = 1 if the reverse inequality holds. Observe that the ￿rst term on the l.h.s. is negative if (1)
holds, while the second term is positive if (2) holds.
Introductory o⁄ers. Next, let us consider introductory o⁄ers, where p1 < p2. Independently of
his beliefs, each consumer has a dominant strategy when facing an increasing price path, namely to
demand the good at the low price in period 1, provided the price is not higher than his willingness to
pay. If the consumer is rationed at the low price, his dominant strategy is to demand the good at the
high price in period 2, provided again this price is less than his valuation. Clearly, the monopolist has
no incentive to ration consumers at the high price. Without loss of generality, she may thus set total
capacity k = m(HjG) + m(LjG) so as to always meet demand in the second period. In each period,
the monopolist optimally extracts all of the surplus of some consumer type. Under introductory o⁄ers,
the monopolist will therefore set prices p1 = v(L) and p2 = 1. We can thus restrict attention to the
following family of introductory o⁄er strategies, (v(L);1;k1;m(HjG)+m(LjG)), which is parametrized
by k1. We denote these strategies by IO(k1). Without loss of generality, we can assume that ￿rst-period
capacity k1 ￿ m(HjG) + m(LjG). Expected pro￿ts are then given by
￿IO(k1)
= (1 ￿ ￿)[v(L)minfk1;m(HjB) + m(LjB)g
+1
￿















Since this expression is piecewise linear in k1, the unique candidate for an optimal introductory o⁄er
strategy is IO(m(HjB) + m(LjB)). That is, the monopolist optimally sets the ￿rst-period capacity k1
so as to just serve all demand at the low price p1 = v(L) when demand is in the bad state. In the good
demand state, on the other hand, the monopolist sells m(HjB) + m(LjB) units at the low ￿rst-period
price, and serves all rationed high valuation consumers at the high second-period price. The induced
probabilities of serving consumers are thus given by





R(LjB) = 1: (ProbIO)
These induced probabilities in conjunction with the induced prices P(Lj￿) = v(L) for ￿ = G;B,













constitute a mechanism of the class de￿ned above. In particular, the (interim) incentive constraint of
the high consumer type is binding, as are the (ex post) individual rationality constraints of the low type.
11The expected pro￿ts can be obtained by inserting the probabilities (ProbIO) into equation (3). As can
be seen from (ProbIO), IO(m(HjB) + m(LjB)) never implements the optimal mechanism.
Uniform pricing versus introductory o⁄ers. We ￿rst compare the optimal introductory o⁄er strategy
with the low uniform price v(L). The induced probabilities R(￿j￿) only di⁄er for the low type in the good
demand state: under the low uniform price, R(LjG) = 1, while under the optimal introductory o⁄er
strategy, R(LjG) < 1.14 Hence, the introductory o⁄er strategy is more pro￿table than the low uniform
price if and only if R(LjG) = 0 in the optimal mechanism. That is, ￿IO(m(HjB)+m(LjB)) > ￿U(v(L))
if and only if equation (1) holds, i.e.,
m(HjG) > [m(HjG) + m(LjG)]v(L):
Second, we compare introductory o⁄ers with the high uniform price of 1. The induced probabilities only
di⁄er for the low type: while the low type consumers never purchase the good under the high uniform
price, they obtain the good with positive probability in both demand states when the monopolist uses
the optimal introductory o⁄er strategy. Inserting the di⁄erence in the expected probabilities into the
expression for the monopolist￿ s expected revenue, equation (3), we obtain that ￿IO(m(HjB)+m(LjB)) >














Observe that the ￿rst term on the l.h.s. is negative if (1) holds, whereas the second term is positive if (2)
holds. From the pro￿t comparison with the low uniform price, introductory o⁄ers can only dominate
uniform pricing if R(LjG) = 0 in the optimal mechanism, i.e., the ￿rst term on the l.h.s. of (5) is
negative. Given that the optimal R(LjG) is equal to 0, condition (5) can only be satis￿ed if R(LjB) = 1
in the optimal mechanism, i.e., only if the second term on the l.h.s. of (5) is positive. In this case, there
exists a trade o⁄between introductory o⁄ers and the high uniform price. In the good demand state, too
many units are sold to low type consumers under introductory o⁄ers, while in the bad demand, too few
units are sold under the high uniform price. Relative to the high uniform price, the loss of introductory
o⁄ers in the good demand state is




while the gain in the bad demand state is
fm(HjB) ￿ [m(HjB) + m(LjB)]v(L)g:
The expected gain outweighs the expected loss if and only if (5) holds. This shows that if R(LjG) = 0
and R(LjB) = 1 in the optimal mechanism, introductory o⁄ers may improve upon uniform pricing, but
fail to implement the optimal mechanism.
Put di⁄erently, for conditions (5) and (1) to hold simultaneously, it is necessary that equation (2)
holds, i.e., m(HjB) < [m(HjB) + m(LjB)]v(L). This equation says that, in the bad demand state, the
optimal state-contingent price is p = v(L). Conditions (2) and (1) are thus necessary (but not su¢ cient)
for introductory o⁄ers to dominate uniform pricing. To see this, suppose otherwise. There are three
cases to consider. (i) Condition (1) holds, but (2) does not, and so the ex post pro￿t-maximizing price
in both demand states is p = 1. Clearly, in this case, the uniform price p = 1 is (ex ante) more pro￿table
14If total demand does not expand in the good demand state, i.e., m(HjG) + m(LjG) = m(HjB) + m(LjB), we have
R(LjG) = 1 in (ProbIO) and the optimal introductory o⁄er strategy is degenerate in that all units are always sold at the
low price v(L).
12than the introductory o⁄er strategy. (ii) Condition (1) does not hold, but (2) does, and so the ex post
pro￿t-maximizing price in both demand states is p = v(L). Clearly, in this case, the uniform price
p = v(L) is (ex ante) more pro￿table than the introductory o⁄er strategy. (iii) Both conditions (1)
and (2) do not hold, and so the ex post pro￿t-maximizing price is p = 1 (p = v(L)) in the bad (good)
demand state. In this case, the introductory o⁄er strategy IO(m(HjB)+m(LjB)) performs worse than
the uniform price p = v(L): in the bad demand state, both strategies lead to the same pro￿ts, while in
the good demand state, the uniform price p = v(L) is ex post optimal, and thus yields higher pro￿ts.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The introductory o⁄er strategy IO(m(HjB) + m(LjB)) maximizes pro￿ts among the
set of selling policies with p1 ￿ p2 if and only if conditions (5) and (1) are satis￿ed.
Final sales. Let us now consider ￿nal sales strategies, where p1 > p2. Clearly, the monopolist
has no incentive to ration demand at the high price. Without loss of generality we can therefore set
￿rst-period capacity k1 = k. For consumers to be willing to purchase the good in the ￿rst period, there
must exist a positive probability that consumers are rationed in the second period. Since consumers
cannot condition their purchasing decision on the state of the world, but only on their own valuation,
any optimal ￿nal sales strategy must have the property that all high type consumers demand the good
in the ￿rst period, while all low types demand the good in the second period (and are rationed with
positive probability). Hence, it is su¢ cient to consider the family of ￿nal sales strategies (parameterized
by capacity k), (b p1(k);v(L);k;k), where b p1(k) is set so as to make high type consumers just indi⁄erent
between demanding the good in the ￿rst period at price b p1(k), and postponing the purchase (so as
to demand the good in the second period at price v(L)). We denote these strategies by FS(k). For
k ￿ m(HjG), the indi⁄erence condition can be written as














where minf[k ￿ m(Hj￿)=m(Lj￿)];1g is the probability of obtaining the good at the low price in demand
state ￿. (For k < m(HjG), rationing occurs even at the high price. This case is considered in the proof of
proposition 3.) Since b p1(k) is piecewise linear in k, there are (at least) two potentially optimal capacity
levels: k = m(HjG) and k = m(HjB) + m(LjB).
It will prove useful to distinguish between two demand regimes; see ￿gure 1 for a graphic illustration.
￿ Weak demand shifts. In this case, the rightward shift of the demand curve is su¢ ciently small in
the sense that the number of high type consumers in the good state is less than the total number
of high and low types in the bad state, i.e., m(HjG) < m(LjB) + m(HjB).
￿ Strong demand shifts. In this case, the rightward shift of the demand curve is su¢ ciently large
in the sense that the number of high type consumers in the good state is greater than the total
number of high and low types in the bad state, i.e., m(HjG) ￿ m(LjB) + m(HjB).
The set of potentially optimal ￿nal sales strategies depends on the demand regime. As the following
proposition shows, we only have to consider a single ￿nal sales strategy under strong demand shifts and
two ￿nal sales strategies under weak demand shifts.
Proposition 3 Under strong demand shifts, the only potentially optimal ￿nal sales strategy is FS(m(HjG)).
Under weak demand shifts, the only potentially optimal ￿nal sales strategies are FS(m(HjG)) and
FS(m(HjB) + m(LjB)).
13Figure 1: Weak and strong demand shifts.
14Proof. See Appendix.
Strong demand shifts. Suppose ￿rst that demand shifts are strong, and so m(HjG) ￿ m(HjB) +
m(LjB). We ￿rst consider the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjG)), where, from equation (6), the ￿rst-
period price b p1(m(HjG)) is given by
b p1 =
￿m(HjG) + (1 ￿ ￿)m(HjB)v(L)
￿m(HjG) + (1 ￿ ￿)m(HjB)
:
That is, the optimal ￿rst-period price is a weighted average of p = 1 and p = v(L), where the weight on
the higher price is Q(GjH), the probability that demand is in the good state, conditional on drawing
a high valuation. Capacity k = m(HjG) is such that, in both demand states, high type consumers are
not rationed in the ￿rst period. In contrast, low type consumers, who demand the good in the second
period, are rationed with probability 1 in the good demand state, while they are not rationed in the
bad demand state. The induced probabilities of serving consumers are thus given by
R(Hj￿) = 1 for ￿ = G;B;
R(LjG) = 0;
R(LjB) = 1: (ProbFSstrong)
The expected pro￿ts can be obtained by inserting the probabilities (ProbFSstrong) into equation (3).
Observe that the optimal ￿nal sales strategy implies the same probabilities as the optimal mechanism
if and only if (1) and (2) hold. It follows that the ￿nal sales strategy is revenue equivalent to the
(nonfeasible) optimal state-contingent selling policy, where the monopolist charges the high (uniform)
price p = 1 in the good demand state and the low price p = v(L) in the bad demand state. Note
that the revenue equivalence does not necessarily imply the same induced prices for the high type
consumers: in the optimal mechanism, P(HjG) and P(HjB) are not uniquely determined. Indeed,
P(HjG) = P(HjB) = b p1(m(HjG)) under ￿nal sales, while P(HjG) = 1 and P(HjB) = v(L) under the
optimal state-contingent pricing policy.15
If conditions (1) and (2) hold, the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjG)) is thus revenue equivalent to
the optimal state-contingent selling policy, while uniform pricing and introductory o⁄ers lead to lower
pro￿ts. Moreover, recall that introductory o⁄ers are more pro￿table than uniform pricing only if these
two conditions are satis￿ed. Hence, introductory o⁄ers are never optimal: they are either dominated by
uniform pricing or by ￿nal sales.
Above, we have shown that the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjG)) is optimal amongst all feasible
selling strategies when conditions (1) and (2) hold. Which strategy is optimal when one of the two
conditions is not satis￿ed? If equation (1) does not hold, then the optimal state-contingent price in
the good demand state is p = v(L). In this case, the uniform price p = v(L) dominates the state-
contingent strategy (p(G) = 1; p(B) = v(L)): the uniform price yields the same revenues in the bad
demand state and higher revenues in the good state. Hence, if equation (1) does not hold, the ￿nal sales
strategy is dominated by the uniform price p = v(L). Similarly, if condition (2) is not satis￿ed, then the
optimal state-contingent price in the bad demand state is p = 1. In this case, the uniform price p = 1
dominates the state-contingent strategy (p(G) = 1; p(B) = v(L)) and, by revenue equivalence, the ￿nal
sales strategy: the uniform price yields the same revenues as the state-contingent strategy in the good
demand state and higher revenues in the bad state. We can summarize our results as follows.
15The ￿nal sales strategy leads to lower pro￿ts than the optimal state-contingent pricing policy when demand is in
the good state since the high type consumers obtain the good at price b p1(m(HjG)) < 1. The loss in pro￿t is thus equal
to [1 ￿ b p1(m(HjG))]m(HjG). In expected terms, this loss is exactly o⁄set by the gain in the bad demand state, which
amounts to [b p1(m(HjG)) ￿ v(L)]m(HjB).
15Lemma 1 Under strong demand shifts, introductory o⁄ers are never optimal, and hence the pro￿t-
maximizing selling policy involves a non-increasing price path, p1 ￿ p2. If conditions (1) and (2) hold,
the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjG)) is optimal, and hence p1 > p2. Otherwise, uniform pricing is
optimal.
As pointed out in the introduction, price dispersion is a widely observed phenomenon. In our
framework, introductory o⁄ers and ￿nal sales trivially exhibit dispersion of posted prices. Moreover,
these strategies induce dispersion of prices at which trade occurs within at least one demand state. The
￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjG)) induces dispersion of prices at which trade occurs only when demand
is in the bad state: all high type consumers buy the good in the ￿rst period, and all low type consumers
demand the good in the second period. (The same happens in the good demand state, but there is no
residual supply at the low price.) In contrast, the introductory o⁄er strategy IO(m(HjB) + m(LjB))
induces price dispersion in the good state.
Weak demand shifts. Suppose now that demand shifts are weak, and so m(HjG) < m(HjB)+m(LjB).
First, let us consider the ￿nal sales strategy (b p1(m(HjB) + m(LjB));v(L);m(HjB) + m(LjB)), where
the ￿rst-period price is given by
b p1(m(HjB) + m(LjB))
= v(L) + [1 ￿ v(L)]Q(GjH)
￿




If the monopolist employs this ￿nal sales strategy, then all high types will purchase the good in the ￿rst
period, and all low types try to purchase in the second period. Total capacity k is chosen such that there
is no rationing in either period when demand is in the bad state, but when demand is in the good state,
(low type) consumers are rationed with probability [m(HjG) + m(LjG) ￿ m(HjB) ￿ m(LjB)]=m(LjG)
in the second period. That is, the induced probabilities of serving consumers are given by
R(Hj￿) = 1 for ￿ = G;B;
R(LjG) =
m(HjB) + m(LjB) ￿ m(HjG)
m(LjG)
;
R(LjB) = 1: (ProbFS1weak)
The expected pro￿ts can be obtained by inserting the probabilities (ProbFS1weak) into equation (3).
Note that this ￿nal sales strategy never implements the optimal mechanism. Nevertheless, as we will
show below, it can be the optimal selling policy.
Observe that the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjB) + m(LjB)) di⁄ers from the introductory o⁄er
strategy IO(m(HjB) + m(LjB)) only in the induced probability of serving low type consumers in the
good demand state, R(LjG). Comparing (ProbFS1weak) and (ProbIO), it is easily checked that this
probability is lower under the ￿nal sales strategy. This should not be surprising: total capacity is
k = m(HjB) + m(LjB) under the ￿nal sales strategy, while the introductory o⁄er strategy uses the
same capacity as ￿rst-period capacity k1 only and induces additional trade in the second period when
demand is in the good state. Hence, the ￿nal sales strategy dominates the introductory o⁄er strategy if
and only if R(LjG) = 0 in the optimal mechanism, i.e., if and only if condition (1) is satis￿ed (which says
that the optimal state-contingent price in the good demand state is 1). However, recall that condition
(1) is necessary for introductory o⁄ers to dominate the low uniform price. It follows that introductory
o⁄ers are never optimal: they are either dominated by the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjB) + m(LjB))
or the low uniform price. By the same argument, the ￿nal sales strategy dominates the low uniform
pricing strategy if and only if condition (1) holds.
16Second, let us consider the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjG)), where the ￿rst-period price is given by
b p1(m(HjG)) = 1 ￿
[1 ￿ v(L)](1 ￿ ￿)m(HjB)






Note that the price b p1(m(HjG)) (and hence the pro￿t of FS(m(HjG))) under weak demand shifts di⁄ers
from the price b p1(m(HjG)) (and hence the resulting pro￿t) under strong demand shifts since, under
weak demand shifts, the low type consumers are rationed with positive probability in the bad demand
state. Under weak demand shifts, the induced probabilities of serving consumers are given by






The expected pro￿ts can be obtained by inserting the probabilities (ProbFS2weak) into equation (3).
Observe that the induced probabilities di⁄er from those of the high uniform price p = 1 only in the
higher value of R(LjB). Hence, the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjG)) dominates the high uniform price
if and only if R(LjB) = 1 in the optimal mechanism, i.e., if and only if condition (2) is satis￿ed (and so
the optimal state-contingent price in the bad demand state is v(L)).
We now claim that the optimal selling policy is a ￿nal sales strategy if and only if conditions (1) and
(2) hold. The ￿if part￿of this claim follows directly from above: the low uniform price is dominated by
FS(m(HjB)+m(LjB)) if (1) is satis￿ed, while the high uniform price is dominated by FS(m(HjG)) if
(2) holds What about the ￿only if part￿ ? Clearly, if neither condition (1) nor (2) hold, both ￿nal sales
strategies are dominated by a uniform pricing strategy. On the other hand, if (1) holds, but (2) does
not, then the high uniform price is the only selling strategy (of the class considered in this paper) that
implements the optimal mechanism. If the reverse holds, then the low uniform price is the only selling
policy that implements the optimum. We thus have the following result.
Lemma 2 Under weak demand shifts, introductory o⁄ers are never optimal, and hence the pro￿t-
maximizing selling policy involves a non-increasing price path, p1 ￿ p2. If conditions (1) and (2) hold,
either the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjB) + m(LjB)) or FS(m(HjG)) is optimal, and hence p1 > p2.
Otherwise, uniform pricing is optimal.
As under strong demand shifts, the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjG)) induces intertemporal dispersion
of prices (at which trade occurs) only when demand is in the bad state: in the good demand state, all
m(HjG) units are sold at the high ￿rst-period price. In contrast, the ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjB)+
m(LjB)), which employs a larger capacity, induces intertemporal price dispersion in both demand states:
even in the good demand state, some units are sold at the low second-period price.
To complete the analysis of the optimal selling policy, we have to compare the two potentially
optimal ￿nal sales strategies. Final sales strategy FS(m(HjB) + m(LjB)) involves a larger capacity
than FS(m(HjG)), and thus a larger quantity sold in both demand states. In the good state, the
di⁄erence in the probability of serving the low type is




m(HjB) + m(LjB) ￿ m(HjG)
m(LjB)
17in the bad state. If conditions (1) and (2) hold (and uniform pricing dominated by one of the ￿nal
sales strategies), any optimal mechanism satis￿es R(LjG) = 0 and R(LjB) = 1. Under these conditions,
FS(m(HjB)+m(LjB)) performs thus better than FS(m(HjG)) in the bad demand state and worse in
the good demand state. Inserting the di⁄erence in the probabilities into the expression for the monop-
olist￿ s expected revenue, equation (3), we obtain that FS(m(HjB)+m(LjB)) dominates FS(m(HjG))
if and only if
￿
m(LjG)
f[m(HjG) + m(LjG)]v(L) ￿ m(HjG)g +
1 ￿ ￿
m(LjB)
f[m(HjB) + m(LjB)]v(L) ￿ m(HjB)g > 0:
The ￿rst term on the l.h.s. is negative if (1) holds, whereas the second terms is positive if (2) holds.
Main results. In this paper, we have shown that the revenue equivalence between the best introduc-
tory o⁄ers and ￿nal sales strategies breaks down under demand uncertainty. Perhaps more surprisingly,
introductory o⁄ers are never optimal in our model. For an introductory o⁄er strategy to be more prof-
itable than uniform pricing, there has to exist a tension between the good and the bad demand state
in that the ex post optimal (uniform) price in the good state has to be higher than the one in the bad
demand state, i.e., m(HjG) > [m(HjG)+m(LjG)]v(L) and m(HjB) < [m(HjB)+m(LjB)]v(L), which
are conditions (1) and (2), respectively. However, it is exactly this tension that makes also the ￿nal
sales strategy more attractive than uniform pricing. Moreover, as shown above, in this case, ￿nal sales
dominate introductory o⁄ers as they involve a smaller quantity in the good demand state (and the same
quantity in the bad demand state). Combining lemmas 1 and 2, yields our main result:
Proposition 4 Introductory o⁄ers are never optimal, and hence the pro￿t-maximizing selling policy
involves a non-increasing price path, p1 ￿ p2. If conditions (1) and (2) hold, ￿nal sales are optimal,
and hence p1 > p2. Otherwise, uniform pricing is optimal.
Strategy space. It is possible to show that the monopolist cannot do better by charging more than
two prices. Essentially, the argument is that a consumer of a given type cannot condition his purchasing
decision on the state of demand. Moreover, all consumers of the same type have the same willingness to
pay and the same beliefs about the state of demand. Since there are two consumer types with positive
valuation, the monopolist does not need to charge more than two prices.
Alternative information structure. We have derived our results under the assumption that consumers
do not directly observe the state of demand, but only their own valuation. We now brie￿ y discuss how our
analysis would change under the alternative information structure, where consumers learn the demand
state before making their purchasing decision. For more details, the interested reader is referred to our
working paper, Nocke and Peitz (2003).
Under the alternative information structure, the mechanism design problem described at the begin-
ning of this (sub-)section has to be modi￿ed in only one point: each consumer type now has a separate
(interim) incentive constraint for each state. This implies that there is no ￿interaction￿between the
demand states in the design problem. For each demand state ￿ 2 fG;Bg, the solution to the design
problem satis￿es (ICH;￿) and (XIRL;￿) with equality. Rewriting the monopolist￿ s expected revenue
purely in terms of probabilities, we obtain the same expression as before, equation (3). In particular,
the optimal state-contingent (uniform) prices p(￿) implement the optimal mechanism.
Turning to the optimal selling policy, recall ￿rst that uniform pricing and introductory o⁄ers are
una⁄ected by changes in consumers￿information structure (as consumers have a (weakly) dominant
strategy). This is not true for ￿nal sales strategies, however. Indeed, under the alternative information
structure, each optimal ￿nal sales strategy has the property that high types purchase the good at the
high ￿rst-period price only when demand is in the good state. Accordingly, for any capacity k, the
monopolist now optimally charges an even higher price in the ￿rst period.
18Under strong demand shifts, the unique candidate for an optimal ￿nal sales strategy is p1 = 1,
p2 = v(L), and k = m(HjG). Facing this selling policy, high valuation consumers purchase the good in
the ￿rst period only when demand is in the good state. The ￿nal sales strategy thus implements the
state-contingent (uniform) pricing strategy (p(G) = 1;p(B) = v(L)), and is thus an optimal mechanism
whenever conditions (1) and (2) are satis￿ed. In fact, the strategy is revenue equivalent to the ￿nal
sales strategy FS(m(HjG)) in the original information setting as it induces the same probabilities.
Consequently, introductory o⁄ers are never optimal, while uniform pricing is optimal whenever (1) or
(2) do not hold.




fm(HjG) + m(LjG) ￿ [m(HjB) + m(LjB)] + [m(HjB) + m(LjB) ￿ m(HjG)]v(L)g;
p2 = v(L), and k = m(HjB) + m(LjB). Again, high valuation consumers only purchase the good in
the ￿rst period when demand is in the good state. However, the induced probabilities are the same as
those of ￿nal sales strategy FS(m(HjB) + m(LjB)) in the original information setting. Consequently,
the two strategies are revenue equivalent, and so introductory o⁄ers can never be optimal. We thus
have the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that consumers learn the demand state before making their purchasing decision.
Then, introductory o⁄ers are never optimal, and the optimal strategy of the monopolist involves a non-
increasing price path, p1 ￿ p2.
Under weak demand shifts, the second potentially optimal ￿nal sales strategy involves p1 = 1,
p2 = v(L), and k = m(HjG). The induced probabilities of serving consumers are
R(HjG) = 1




High valuation consumers purchase the good in the ￿rst period only when demand is in the good state.
In the bad state, all consumers demand the good at the low second-period price and are rationed with
the same positive probability. In other words, in the bad demand state, some high valuation consumers
do not obtain the good, while some low valuation consumers do obtain the good, and so this ￿nal sales
strategy leads to an ine¢ cient allocation for a given quantity sold. Nevertheless, it can be the optimal
selling policy. Not surprisingly, then, this strategy leads to lower payo⁄s than the ￿nal sales strategy
FS(m(HjG)) in the original information setting. Hence, under weak demand shifts, conditions (1) and
(2) are necessary, but no longer su¢ cient, for ￿nal sales to be the optimal selling policy.16
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the optimal intertemporal price-capacity decision of a monopolist who
faces uncertain demand. In particular, we have investigated the optimality of uniform pricing, ￿nal
sales, and introductory o⁄er strategies. To this end, we have analyzed a model where the number of
high and low valuation consumers depends on the demand state, which can be either good or bad. Our
main results can be summarized as follows.
16Under weak demand shifts, it is optimal for some parameter constellations to use a three-price strategy, which is a
hybrid pricing strategy containing introductory o⁄er and ￿nal sales. Interestingly, allowing for such a hybrid three-price
strategy, we restore our previous result that uniform pricing is suboptimal if and only if conditions (1) and (2) hold. For
details, see Nocke and Peitz (2003).
19￿ Introductory o⁄ers can dominate uniform pricing only if the optimal state-contingent price is high
in the good state and low in the bad state. However, in this case, they are dominated by ￿nal
sales.
￿ Whenever the optimal state-contingent price in the good state is high and in the bad state is low,
￿nal sales are the optimal selling policy. (If, in addition, demand shifts are strong, ￿nal sales
implement the optimal mechanism.)
￿ Otherwise, uniform pricing is the optimal selling policy.
We have shown that for a pro￿t comparison of the di⁄erent selling policies, we only need to consider
the induced probabilities of serving the two consumer types in the two demand states. Clearly, uniform
pricing can only be suboptimal if the optimal state-contingent prices di⁄er across demand states. In
particular, suppose that the optimal state-contingent price is high in the good demand state and low
in the bad state. In this case, the monopolist would optimally like to always serve high valuation
consumers, but to serve low valuation consumers only in the bad demand state. A high uniform price
thus leads to too little trade because, in the bad demand state, low valuation consumers are never
served. A low uniform price leads to too much trade because, in the good demand state, low valuation
consumers are always served. Certain ￿nal sales and introductory o⁄ers perform better than the low
uniform price because they imply that only a share (which may be zero) of low valuation consumers are
served in the good demand state, while all consumers are served in the bad demand state. Furthermore,
certain ￿nal sales perform better than the high uniform price because they imply that a positive share
(which may be one) of low valuation consumers are served in the bad demand state, while no low
valuation consumers are served in the good demand state. We have shown that the best ￿nal sales
strategy dominates uniform pricing and introductory o⁄ers as its induced probabilities come closest to
those of the optimal state-contingent pricing policy. If demand shifts are strong (so that the number of
high and low valuation consumers in the bad demand state is less than the number of high valuation
consumers in the good demand state), the best ￿nal sales strategy is revenue-equivalent to the optimal
state-contingent pricing policy. Otherwise, it leads to lower revenues since either some low valuation
consumers obtain the good in the good demand state or some consumers do not obtain the good in the
bad demand state.
Below, we discuss our key assumptions and comment on modi￿cations and extensions. We distinguish
between assumptions concerning demand side and supply side characteristics.
Demand side: Demand shifts. We have derived our results under the assumption that demand shifts
are horizontal in that they only a⁄ect the mass of consumers of each type, but not a given type￿ s
valuation. Alternatively, we may assume that demand shifts are vertical in that the mass of each
consumer type is independent of the demand state, but each type￿ s willingness to pay is greater in the
good demand state than in the bad state. Formally, m(￿j￿) is independent of ￿, while the valuation
of high and low type consumers is increasing in the demand state: v(￿jG) > v(￿jB) for ￿ 2 fH;Lg.
This implies that a consumer￿ s valuation fully reveals the underlying demand state ￿. In our discussion
paper (Nocke and Peitz, 2003), we show that the optimal selling strategy under vertical demand shifts
always entails ￿nal sales, while uniform pricing and introductory o⁄er strategies are dominated. Thus,
the monopolist optimally sets a high price in period 1 and a low price in period 2. (It can be shown that
ex ante the monopolist has no incentive to o⁄er the good in later periods.) However, this selling policy
induces intertemporal dispersion only of posted prices but not of prices at which trade occurs since all
units are either sold in period 1 (when ￿ = G) or in period 2 (when ￿ = B).
Demand side: Rationing scheme. In our analysis, we have assumed random or proportional rationing
(where high type consumers are rationed with the same probability as low types). In general, the
optimal strategy of the monopolist depends on the particular rationing rule. Clearly, any change in the
rationing rule toward e¢ cient (or parallel) rationing (so that high type consumers are rationed with a
20lower probability than low types) makes it more di¢ cult for the monopolist to use rationing as a tool
of her optimal strategy. This will reduce the pro￿tability of ￿nal sales and introductory o⁄er strategies.
However, if the optimal strategy involves rationing with probability 1 (as it does under vertical demand
shifts), then the rationing rule becomes irrelevant.
Demand side: Multiplicity of consumer equilibrium. As pointed out before, for any given ￿nal sales
strategy, there may be a multiplicity of consumer equilibria. In our analysis, we have selected the
consumer equilibrium that is most favorable for the monopolist. We believe that it is reasonable to
select this equilibrium. In particular, it is often the unique consumer equilibrium if one introduces some
heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay amongst consumers of a particular type. This observation is
illustrated in our discussion paper (Nocke and Peitz, 2003).
Demand side: Consumer decision making. For a ￿nal sales strategy to work, consumers have to
form beliefs about the likelihood of being rationed in the future. Since the probability of rationing
depends on the behavior of other consumers, high type consumers do not have a dominant strategy.
This requires consumers to be quite sophisticated in their decision-making. In contrast, when facing an
introductory o⁄er strategy (or a uniform price), consumers have a dominant strategy (and can follow
a simple decision rule): ￿demand the good at the low price; if it is sold out at this price, buy it at
the higher price (provided the price is less than your valuation).￿In a world where consumers are not
sophisticated decision makers, a ￿rm may thus favor an introductory o⁄er strategy (or a uniform price)
over a ￿nal sales strategy.
Supply side: Capacity costs. We have assumed that the monopolist faces zero costs of capacity.
Would introductory o⁄ers still be dominated if we allowed for positive capacity costs? In our analysis,
we have shown that whenever an introductory o⁄er strategy performs better than uniform pricing, it is
dominated by some ￿nal sales strategy. Consider the generalization to positive and constant marginal
costs of capacity, ck. As the monopolist changes her strategy from a high uniform price to ￿nal sales
to introductory o⁄ers to a low uniform price, she has to increase total capacity with each change. This
means that with an increase of the capacity cost ck the condition which ensures that introductory o⁄ers
dominate the low uniform price becomes less strict. However, the same happens to the condition that
￿nal sales dominate introductory o⁄ers. It can be shown that introductory o⁄ers dominate the low
uniform price if
￿fm(HjG) ￿ v(L)[m(LjG) + m(HjG)]g + ckm(LjG) > 0:
Exactly the same condition implies, however, that ￿nal sales dominate introductory o⁄ers. Hence, the
optimal selling policy never involves introductory o⁄ers.
Supply side: Fixed capacity. In our analysis, we have assumed that the monopolist chooses total
capacity k. Suppose now instead that the monopolist faces the restriction k ￿ k, where k is an exogenous
capacity limit. This hypothesis may apply well to the case of ticket sales for concerts and the like,
where the maximum number of seats in the concert hall is ￿xed. How does this assumption a⁄ect
the pro￿tability of the di⁄erent selling policies? In the absence of an exogenous capacity limit, the
(maximum) output sold in the good demand state is lower under the best ￿nal sales strategy than
under the best introductory o⁄er strategy. We can then easily show that whenever there exists a ￿nal
sales strategy which dominates introductory o⁄ers in the absence of exogenous capacity limits, there
exists some ￿nal sales strategy which dominates introductory o⁄ers in the presence of exogenous capacity
limits.17 Hence, ￿nal sales strategies perform even better - relative to introductory o⁄er strategies -
when the monopolist faces an (exogenous) capacity constraint.
However, this does not mean that introductory o⁄er strategies cannot be optimal in this case since
parameters may be such that introductory o⁄ers dominate ￿nal sales. In section 3, we have shown that, in
this case, introductory o⁄er strategies are dominated by the uniform price p = v(L). This may no longer
17Note that for su¢ ciently small exogenous capacities, namely k ￿ m(HjB), optimal ￿nal sales and introductory o⁄er
strategies degenerate to uniform pricing.
21hold when the monopolist faces an exogenous capacity limit. To be precise, without exogenous capacity
limits, introductory o⁄ers are dominated by ￿nal sales strategies if m(HjG) > [m(HjG)+m(LjG)]v(L),
and by the uniform price p = v(L) if the reverse inequality holds. The best introductory o⁄er strategy
involves, in the good demand state, a total quantity of






m(HjG) ￿ b k;
which is always less than m(HjG) + m(LjG). Hence, for k 2 [b k;m(HjG) + m(LjG)), the exogenous
capacity limit is not binding when the monopolist uses this strategy. On the other hand, for k <
m(HjG)+m(LjG), the capacity constraint would be binding if the monopolist charged the uniform price
p = v(L). Therefore, there exist parameter constellations under which introductory o⁄er strategies are
optimal in the presence of exogenous capacity limits. In particular, at k = b k, the best introductory o⁄er
strategy and the uniform price p = v(L) induce the same quantity sold in both demand states, but in
the high demand state some units are sold at the high price when the monopolist uses the introductory
o⁄er.
To summarize, exogenous capacity limits make ￿nal sales more attractive relative to introductory
o⁄ers. However, there exist parameter constellations under which introductory o⁄er strategies are
optimal since a (low) uniform price becomes less attractive when the monopolist faces an exogenous
capacity constraint.
Supply side: The monopolist￿ s decision making. In our model, we have assumed that the monopolist
ex ante commits to a price for each period, a ￿rst-period capacity, and a total capacity. Not all of the
available selling strategies require such commitment, however.
￿ Price commitment. Introductory o⁄er strategies may require less (intertemporal) commitment
power than ￿nal sales strategies. When using an introductory o⁄er strategy, the monopolist has
no incentive to change her price (or capacity) ex post in period 2. (In fact, it can be shown that an
introductory o⁄er strategy does not require commitment to the second-period price.) In contrast,
when using a ￿nal sales strategy, the monopolist has ex post an incentive to raise her capacity or
price in period 2.
￿ Capacity commitment. A ￿nal sales strategy requires a commitment to total capacity. Such
commitment can be implemented if total production is determined ex ante and if the production
of additional units is su¢ ciently costly (high marginal costs or high ￿xed costs for an additional
run). An introductory o⁄er strategy requires a commitment to ￿rst-period capacity. This can be
implemented if the monopolist produces in each period and has limited production capacity per
period.
Hence, while our (simple) model predicts that we should not observe introductory o⁄ers (but rather
￿nal sales and uniform prices), the demanding commitment requirements for ￿nal sales strategies may
give a rationale, within our framework, for the use of introductory o⁄er strategies.18
Another reason for the use of introductory o⁄ers strategies is that, in contrast to ￿nal sales, goods
can be o⁄ered concurrently at di⁄erent prices, and consumers can freely choose at which price they want
to buy the good. Clearly, consumers will select the cheaper units ￿rst, and once these items are stocked
out, high valuation consumers purchase the high priced units.
Our paper is also connected to several general themes in the industrial organization and microeco-
nomics literature.
18In particular, introductory o⁄er strategies can be used in durable goods monopoly with a Coasian commitment problem
(see Denicolo and Garella, 1999).
22The economics of rationing. In this paper, we provide a justi￿cation for the use of rationing as
part of the optimal selling strategy of a monopolist. However, ours is not the ￿rst paper to point
out that consumer rationing may be an equilibrium phenomenon. Apart from consumer segmentation,
reasons for rationing include sunk investments by consumers (Gilbert and Klemperer, 2000), buying
frenzies (DeGraba, 1995), bundling (DeGraba and Mohammed, 1999), and direct demand externalities
(e.g., Becker, 1991, Karni and Levin, 1994). In our model, we do not need any of these demand-side
considerations to generate rationing as an equilibrium outcome.
Price dispersion. Our paper contributes to the literature on price dispersion, initiated by Salop
(1977). In the model presented in this paper, the optimal ￿nal sales strategy induces price dispersion
within states. That is, in at least one demand state, the good is traded at di⁄erent prices.19 In our
model, intertemporal price dispersion (within states) may thus arise in the absence of discounting (see,
for instance, Stokey, 1979, for an analysis of price dispersion with discounting ). We may interpret the
probability of rationing in our model as a ￿discount rate￿ , which is endogenously determined.
Endogenous quality. Our paper is loosely connected to the literature on product di⁄erentiation. In
the context of ￿nal sales, we may interpret the probability of obtaining the good as the quality of the
good. If the price of the good is adjusted by this probability, the model corresponds to a model of quality
di⁄erentiation such as Mussa and Rosen (1978). In contrast to Mussa and Rosen (and the literature
on vertical product di⁄erentiation in general), the good￿ s quality under a priority pricing scheme is
endogenously determined by demand (and thus ultimately by prices and capacity). In the literature
on product di⁄erentiation, on the other hand, the ￿rm directly controls quality. The use of di⁄erent
qualities or classes of service is common in the pricing of tickets (see Rosen and Rosen￿eld, 1997, for an
economic analysis).
Final sales as a marketing strategy. More generally, our paper contributes to the literature on
selling strategies of a ￿rm with market power. We have shown that a ￿nal sales strategy, which involves
restricting total capacity and thus leads to consumer rationing, may e⁄ectively separate between demand
states and consumers types. Sophisticated price-capacity strategies can thus be used by a monopolist to
segment the market for a homogeneous good. Price-capacity strategies may be superior to other non-
price strategies such as product di⁄erentiation, which may be more costly to implement or may reduce
consumers￿reservation values (as in the case of damaged goods). Introductory o⁄er strategies are less
￿sophisticated￿than ￿nal sales strategies in that they do not fully segment the market by consumer
types. In our world with commitment and rational consumers, we have shown that introductory o⁄er
strategies are never the optimal marketing strategy. Nevertheless, as argued above, since they require
less sophisticated consumer behavior (and perhaps less commitment power by the seller), introductory
o⁄ers may sometimes be the preferred selling strategy.
19As discussed in our discussion paper (Nocke and Peitz, 2003), under vertical demand shifts, ￿nal sales induce price
dispersion only across states. That is, while the monopolist posts di⁄erent prices for di⁄erent periods, in each demand
state, trade occurs in only one period. In the alternative information setting of our model, both types of price dispersion
are induced by (di⁄erent) ￿nal sales strategies.
23Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
As pointed out in the main text, any optimal ￿nal sales strategy must be such that all high types
are just willing to demand the good at the high price. Hence, any optimal ￿nal sales strategy is of the
form (b p1(k);v(L);k), where b p1(k) is chosen so as to make high type consumers just indi⁄erent between
purchasing at b p1(k) and delaying the purchase.
Step 1. Suppose k 2 [m(HjB);m(HjG)]. In this case, rationing occurs even at the high ￿rst-period
price (when demand is in the good state). If k ￿ minfm(HjG);m(HjB) + m(LjB)g, a high type
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The monopolist￿ s expected pro￿t is then
￿FS(k) = ￿b p1(k)k + (1 ￿ ￿)fb p1(k)m(HjB) + v(L)[k ￿ m(HjB)]g;
which is non-linear in k.
Similarly, if k 2 [minfm(HjG);m(HjB) + m(LjB)g;m(HjG)], the ￿rst-period price is equal to









and the expected pro￿t is given by
￿FS(k) = ￿b p1(k)k + (1 ￿ ￿)[b p1(k)m(HjB) + v(L)m(LjB)];
which again is non-linear in k.
Let







and note that p1(k) > b p1(k) for all k < m(HjG), and p1(m(HjG)) = b p1(m(HjG)). Next, let
￿FS(k) ￿ ￿p1(k)m(HjG) + (1 ￿ ￿)fp1(k)m(HjB) + v(L)minfk ￿ m(HjB)g;m(LjB)g;
and note that ￿FS(k) > ￿FS(k) for all k < m(HjG), and ￿FS(m(HjG)) = ￿FS(m(HjG)). Moreover,
observe that ￿FS(k) is linear in k for k ￿ minfm(HjG);m(HjB) + m(LjB)g, and independent of k on
[m(HjB) + m(LjB);m(HjG)].
We now claim that ￿FS(m(HjB)) is equal to ￿U(1), the pro￿t from the uniform price p = 1. To see
this, note that p1(m(HjB)) = 1, and
￿FS(m(HjB)) = ￿m(HjG) + (1 ￿ ￿)m(HjB) = ￿U(1):
24Since ￿FS(k) is linear for k ￿ minfm(HjG);m(HjB) + m(LjB)g, it follows that an optimal ￿nal sales
strategy must have k ￿ minfm(HjG);m(HjB) + m(LjB)g. Moreover, since ￿FS(k) is constant on
[m(HjB) + m(LjB);m(HjG)], strictly larger than ￿FS(k) for all k < m(HjG), and ￿FS(m(HjG)) =
￿FS(m(HjG)), an optimal ￿nal sales strategy must have k ￿ m(HjG). Hence, there cannot be rationing
at the high price.
Step 2. Suppose k 2 [m(HjG);m(HjG)+m(LjG)]. In this case, rationing can only occur at the low
price. The indi⁄erence condition for high type consumers can now be written as














The expected pro￿t is then
￿FS(k) = ￿fb p1(k)m(HjG) + v(L)[k ￿ m(HjG)]g
+(1 ￿ ￿)[fb p1(k)m(HjB) + v(L)min[m(LjB);k ￿ m(HjB)]g;
which is linear in k on [m(HjG);m(HjB) + m(LjB)], provided this interval is non-empty (i.e., when
horizontal demand shifts are weak), and on [maxfm(HjG);m(HjB) + m(LjB)g;m(HjG) + m(LjG)].
Hence, under strong horizontal demand shifts (where m(HjG) ￿ m(HjB) + m(LjB)), the unique
candidate for an interior optimum is at capacity k = m(HjG). Under weak horizontal demand shifts
(where m(HjG) < m(HjB) + m(LjB)), there are two candidates: k = m(HjG) and k = m(HjB) +
m(LjB).
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